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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
REDWOOD LAND COMPANY, 
fl partnership, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FARRELL W. KIMBALL and 
MRS. FARRELL W. KIMBALL 
Defendants, 
MRS. FARRELL W. KIMBALL, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
10911 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and appellant, Mrs. Farrell W. Kim-
ball fails to state all of the pertinent facts. 
ln her petition for intermediate appeal from 
an order of the District Court denying her motion 
to quash summons and service of summons upon 
2 
her ( R. 8-9), she alleged nothing to show inYalidit 
of summons as issued nor any defect in persun~;11 
service of summons and copy of the complaint. She 
alleged that her substantial rights vvere involYed ·in 
that the question of the validity of service upon het 
outside the State of Utah, upon an imp1·opnly dutul 
return, would purportedly confer jurisdiction upon 
the Utah District Court over her, and her propen
1 
interests in said action; so that a determination a) 
to the correctness of such order as to whether thr: 
Court has jurisdiction over her, or he1· rights in prnp-
erty" should be made by intermediate appeal. (R 0 
I tali cs added.) 
Her motion which was denied by the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah was a 
motion 
"to quash the purported issuance and sen-
ice of summons purportedly made upon her, 
for and upon the following grounds, to-wit: 
"That the return purporting to show sen-
ice of said summons upon the said Mrs. Far-
rell W. Kimball, does not show that it \ras, 
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 4 (g), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended, 
made within five ( 5) days after service upon 
said defendant; said service having been made 
under date of February 15th, 1967, a penoclof 
eight ( 8) days rather than five ( 5) days after 
service." ( R. 1. Italics added.) 
No affidavit was filed by appellant to disputr 
either the validity of the summons as issued nor the 
validity of personal service made upon her on Febri-
3 
~d'\ 7, 1967. She moved to quash the issuance of 
rh~ summons and the service thereof, but predicated 
her motion not on any purported defect in the sum-
, nwns itself nor in the service. She based her motion 
. to quash solely on the fact that the return made by 
! the deputy sheriff was dated eight (8) days after 
personal service of summons on her instead of with-
in five ( 5) days. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
IT IS THE ACTUAL SERVICE OF SUM-
MONS ON DEFENDANT WHICH CONFERS 
.JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER DE-
FENDANT. NOT THE SHERIFF'S RETURN 
:JOR OTHER PROOF OF SERVICE. 
Nowhere in the appellant's motion to quash the 
issuance of summons nor in the motion to quash the 
service of summons is there asserted any claim that 
summons was not validly issued nor that it was not 
ralidly served personally on the appellant at the time 
the sheriff stated in his return that he made per-
wnal service upon said defendant. It is undisputed 
Ihat defendant was personally served with summons 
on February 7, 1967, together with a copy of the 
complaint. The appellant in effect claims that the 
summons and the service thereof on February 7, 
1%7, subsequently became void simply because the 
l'r:turn made by the Sheriff of Sacramento County, 
California, was dated eight (8) days after the date 
uf sen'ice instead of five ( 5) days. 
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Appellant did not file any motion to quash th 
return nor claim any defect in the return exc ~ 
that the sheriff's return was made three (3) d:p 
after the date specified in Rule 4(g) of the Ut;~ 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The only straw at which 
appellant could grasp was the delay of three (3) davs 
in making the sheriff's return. The return itself h~d 
nothing to do with the validity of the summons as 
issued, nor with the validity of personal service actu-
ally made on the defendant. 
Section 17-22-12, U. C. A. 1953, specifies: 
"Return of process as prima-facie evi-
dence. - - - The return of the sheriff upon proc-
ess or notice is prima-facie evidence of the 
facts in such return stated." 
The sheriff's return attached to the summons 
(R. 6-7), clearly shows that Arthur F. Phelps as 
deputy sheriff of Sacramento County, California. on 
February 6, 1967, received the summons and copy 
of complaint, and that he "personally served said 
summons and complaint on the 7th day of February, 
1967, upon Mrs. Ferrell W. Kimball, the defendant 
therein named, in the county of Sacramento, State 
of California, by delivering to and leaving with the 
said Mrs. Farrell W. Kimball, personally, a true 
and correct copy of said summons and complaint'', 
etc. The facts recited in the return are not disputed. 
The evidence before this Court shows that defendant 
was personally served with summons and copy of 
complaint on February 7, 1967. 
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Appellant assumes that a summons properly 
issued and validly served, subsequently became void 
due to failure of the deputy sheriff who served it 
to make his return within five days. In other words, 
appellant contends in substance that a summons valid 
when issued, and validly served, becomes void if the 
sheriff or deputy who properly serves it, neglects 
to make his return within five days after the date 
of actual service. 
This Honorable Court in Federal Land Bank 
of Berkeley v. Brinton, et al., (1944), 106Utah149, 
1. at 154, 146 P. 2d 200 at 201, stated the well estab-
lished rule : 
"The fact that service had been made, by 
the weight of authority, may be proved or 
a defective proof of service may be amended 
after judgment. It is held that it is the fact 
of service that gives jurisdiction, not the proof 
of it ... " 
In that case the affidavit of service of supple-
mental amended complaint was not made and filed 
until three-and-one-half years after the alleged serv-
ice. This Court further stated in that case in affirm-
ing the judgment: 
"* * * Good practice would always com-
mend adequate service and prompt filing of 
return, notwithstanding the abundant author-
ity to the effect that failure or omission to 
make a return or proof of service is not such 
an irregularity as to invalidate a judgment, 
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serv~c~ having: been made. A ~umber of ai.i. 
thonties a_re cited on the quest~on in the cast 
of Bourge10us v. Santa Fe Trail Stages Inc 
43 N.M. 453, 95 P. 2d 204." ' 'I 
In Bourgeious 1'. Santa Fe Trail Stogrs, !Jic., 
43 N. M. 453, 95 P. 2d 204, cited by this Comt, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court declared: 
" ... The summons is the process bv which 
the defendant is summoned to court. The re· 
turn on the other hand is merely the e\·idence 
by which the court is informed that the defend· ' 
ant has been given that indispensible notice 
to appear in court, without which the court is 
powerless to proceed. It is not, howe\·er, tht 
return which gives the court jurisdiction." 
The court further noted that with respect to 
the return, "Its purpose is to apprise the court that 
due service has been had upon the defendant." 
In Clinton v. Miller, (Mont.) 226 P. 2d 487 at 
495, the Court stated: 
"The summons is the process by which 
the defendant is summoned into court. The 
purpose of serving a summons is to give notice 
to the defendant and therebv afford him the 
opportunity to defend himself or his property 
- an essential to due process of law. Hagger-
ty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 
186 P. 2d 884. 
"Process is employed only to obtain juns· 
diction over the person of the defendant. State 
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ex rel. Murphy v. Second Judicial District 
Court, 99 Mont. 209, 41 P. 2d 113. That juris-
diction is acquired at the instant the summons 
is served and before any proof of such serv-
ice has been rnade .... 
"After the summons is served and juris-
diction over the person of defendant is thus 
obtained orderly procedure dictates that evi-
(lence be supplied of the fact that service has 
been made. Where summons is personally 
served upon a defendant by a sheriff the lat-
tel' is required to make a statement in writing 
of what has been done by him in making 
such service which statement is usually either 
endorsed on the summons or attached there-
to. This written statement constitutes the of-
ficer's 'return'. * * * Such 'return' is merely 
the evidence by which the court, the litigants, 
their attorneys or others interested are in-
f orrned that the defendant has been served. 
Compare Smith v. Hamill, 111 Mont. 585, 112 
P. 2d 195. However, it is not the 'return' or 
other evidence or proof of service which gives 
the court jurisdiction over the person of the 
defendant but it is the fact of service that 
confers such jurisdiction .... " (Italics added 
except last four italicized words.) 
Since the appellant was validly served with a 
valid summons and such fact is not disputed, the 
District Court acquired jurisdiction over appellant, 
and the District Court properly denied her motion 
to quash issuance of summons and service of sum-
mons. The only objection asserted against the sher-
iff's return was that it was made three days after 
it should have been made. 
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POINT 2. 
RULE 4(g) DOES NOT STATE THAT FAIL 
URE OF THE SHERIFF OR HIS DEPUTY TO 
MAKE A RETURN WITHIN FIVE DAYS IN. 
VALIDATES EITHER THE SUMMONS OR THE 
SERVICE THEREOF. " 
Nowhere in Rule 4 (g) is there any statemem 
to support the contentions of appellant to the effect 
that failure of the sheriff or his deputy to make 3 
return within five ( 5) days renders either the sum 
mons null and void or nullifies the service of sum. 
mons. As pointed out in Bourgeious v. Santa Fe Trail 
Stages, Inc., 43 N. M. 453, 95 P. 2d 204: 
"The mere failure or omission to return 
the summons with the proof of service is not 
an irregularity which prevents the court from 
conducting the suit in a due, orderly and prop-
er manner. The defendant has been deprived 
of no right by the failure to file the summons 
with the proof of service. The requirements of 
Sec. 105-306, supra, that the summons br 
returned with the proof of service, is primarily 
for the benefit of the court. Its purpose is to 
apprise the court that due service has been 
had upon the defendant." 
Appellant has cited no case to support her con-
tentions, and for want of appropriate legal authority 
has cited cases which are not in point. Her conten-
tions would make the validity of a summons or the 
validity of service depend upon whether or not a 
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sheriff or his deputy made his proof of service with-
in five days. According to appellant, a valid service 
of summons and copy of a complaint on a defendant 
who is generally successful in avoiding service, could 
be annulled by the inability of the sheriff to get 
the returns made within the five days. 
Sec. 17-22-13, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"If a sheriff does not return without de-
lay a process or notice in his possession with 
the necessary endorsement thereon, he is liable 
to the party aggrieved for all damages sus-
tained by him." 
Nowhere in either the statutes or in the Rules 
of Civil Procedure do I find any provision to the 
effect that if the sheriff or his deputy fails to make 
his return within five days, the valid service of a 
v-alid summons is rendered void by the delay. As 
pointed out by the New Mexico Court, the return 
of the sheriff or proof of service is "primarily for the 
benefit of the court. Its purpose is to apprise the 
court that due service has been had upon the defend-
ant." It has been the rule for many years that a 
defective return can be amended even after judg-
ment for the reason that it is the actual service of 
summons which confers jurisdiction on the court over 
the defendant, not the return or other proof of serv-
ice. Furthermore, service of summons is effective 
the moment it is served, not when the sheriff makes 
his return. 
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CONCLUSION 
The contentions of appellant are entirely with. 
out merit for reasons hereinabove set forth, and b~ 
reason of the case law above cited. The defendant 
and appellant was validly served personally wiili 
a valid summons and copy of the complaint, and the 
Court acquired jurisdiction over her by virtue of 
that service. The District Court was not divested of 
that jurisdiction by the delay of three days in the 
making of the proof of service by the deputy sheriff, 
The order of the District Court denying the mo-
tion to quash issuance of summons and service of 
summons should be affirmed with costs to respond· 
ent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REED H. RICHARDS 
500 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
